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Recently, considerable theoretical literature has emerged on voters’ sophistication and its effect on 
democratic functioning. Some works argue that the political choices of more sophisticated voters lead to 
more favourable social outcomes (Brennan, 2017; Somin, 2016). However, Achen and Bartels (2016) 
argue that sophisticated citizens are at least as biased as the unsophisticated. This paper aims to clarify 
this link by investigating the role of education, information acquisition, and interest on bias. The question 
is tested on European Social Survey data. The results show that the level of bias is independent of 
education but is significantly related to both interest and newspaper reading. The findings fully support 
the interpretation of Achen and Bartels (2016) on the effect of sophistication. 




Partisan bias generates systematic errors in citizens’ political evaluations which contributes to 
suboptimal political outcomes. Some scholars argue that partisan bias primarily characterizes 
sophisticates rather than the politically unsophisticated, while others depict sophistication as a 
feature which could decrease bias. The links between sophistication and bias, therefore, are far 
from being clear. 
Investigating the role of sophistication is particularly important, as in the last few years, a 
number of remarkable books have warned about the deleterious effect of voters’ 
unsophistication, irrationality and ignorance on the quality of democratic functioning (Achen 
& Bartels, 2016; Brennan, 2017; Caplan, 2011; Somin, 2016). These theories offer ground for 
the idea that constraining the suffrage of illiterate or unknowledgeable people could lead to 
better democratic outcomes (Brennan, 2009, 2017; Somin, 2016). These ideas become 
especially widespread in instances when the popular will deviates from the will of highly 
educated people, like in the case of the Brexit referendum and the victory of Donald Trump.  
The puzzling question emerges from the contradiction between theories highlighting the 
significance of sophistication in improving democratic functioning and theories built on 
empirical evidence according to which sophisticated voters are more biased information 
processors (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Achen & Bartels, 2016; Campbell, Converse, 
Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Lodge & Hamill, 1986; Lodge & Taber, 2005; Tilley & Hobolt, 2011; 
Wagner & Tarlov & Vivyan, 2014; (while for exceptions see Anduiza, Gallego, & Muñoz, 
2013; Flynn, 2016; Kahne & Bowyer, 2017; Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 2009). To sum up, while 
the question is a fundamental one, both theoretical expectations and empirical results are mixed. 
These contradictions might easily lead to counterintuitive scientific claims and commonplace 
generalisations.  
 This paper contributes to this important debate by investigating the links between 
sophistication and bias on a large repeated cross-national sample of European voters. We test 
our question with multivariate regression models on the repeated cross-sectional dataset of the 
European Social Survey project. The dataset includes individual data from 30 European 
countries and seven survey rounds between 2001 and 2015. 
The results show that political interest and awareness strongly enhance bias, but the effect 
of education is insignificant. The results of our study do not provide support for the idea that 
‘epistocracies’ could potentially outperform democracies (Brennan, 2017), but neither they 
fully support the concerns of those who argue that sophistication exacerbates bias – the educated 
seem just as biased information processors as the uneducated. These results highlight that the 
relationship between political sophistication and partisan bias is far more complex than either 
the pessimistic or the optimistic scenarios described and they question fundamental claims of 
the existent literature in connection with the role of education.  
 
Evidence on the link between sophistication and bias 
 
On Robert C. Luskin’s account (1990), political sophisticates are those who have the 
necessary motivation to seek and process political information, the ability to handle 
information, and who make an effort to do so (see also Converse, 2006). High cognitive 
capacities and substantial effort to acquire information are expected to enable citizens to make 
sound judgements and to articulate their opinions without too much reliance on party heuristics 
(Dalton, 1984, 2007). This leads to the theoretical assumption that more political information 
and higher interest are conducive to more grounded, more rational and less biased decisions in 
comparison with the decisions of citizens with fewer of these capacities. 
In contrast with these expectations, empirical research predominantly finds a positive 
connection between citizens’ sophistication and partisan attitudes. The results of Abramowitz 
and Saunders (2008) on the American electorate demonstrates that interest, awareness and 
partisanship are strongly interrelated, as Converse and his co-authors (1960) demonstrated half 
a century ago. They found that neutral or centrist political attitudes are still strongly correlated 
with the state of being uninformed and disinterest, while the most interested and politically 
aware are strongly polarised in an ideological sense. A bunch of interesting works reinforce this 
perplexing image of partisanship by investigating the gap between more and less sophisticated 
Democrats and Republicans on a set of questions with high partisan relevance.  With growing 
levels of education and interest, the members of these two partisan groups showed growing 
level of dissent on the existence of evolution, anthropogenic global warming and questions 
related to the Iraqi war (Joslyn & Haider-Markel, 2014; Tesler, 2018). In a similar vein, Taber 
and Lodge (2006) and Shani (2006) showed that those having more factual knowledge about 
non-partisan aspects of politics had a stronger tendency to adopt party labels when recalling 
facts with partisan relevance compared to those with little factual knowledge. Reviewing a set 
of similar results, Achen and Bartels (2016, p. 294) argue that ‘political rationalization is often 
most powerful among people who are well-informed and politically engaged, since their 
fundamental political commitments tend to be the most consistent and strongly held’. They also 
argue that sophistication does not provide a remedy for partisan bias, but on the contrary, it may 
enhance partisan motives. As they conclude, the politically interested are less likely to pay 
attention to the recent political situation, as their political attitudes are more stable than their 
less interested counterparts’. Druckman and Lupia arrive at similar conclusions on the nature 
of voters’ thinking, formulating that “the most aware individuals” beliefs are less likely to be 
changed by new information as they have “the ability to generate internal counter-arguments” 
and their knowledge “limits the extent to which new information surprises them” (Druckman 
& Lupia, 2000, p. 14) (see also Taber & Lodge, 2006; Zaller, 1992). 
Furthermore, Lodge and Taber (2005) show that the positive relationship between interest, 
information and bias does not only have cognitive motives, but also affective ones, as 
sophisticates are more strongly influenced by their affective responses when facing political 
concepts. As they conclude, while bias is generally present in political evaluations, political 
sophisticates with strong political attitudes are the most biased information processorsi. 
In contrast to these results, there is only limited empirical evidence (primarily experimental) 
which supports the idea that sophistication might be positively related to more objective 
evaluations. Anduiza et al. (2013) show that politically informed people apply less bias when 
evaluating corruption cases. The results of Taber et al. (2009) are similar, yet inconclusive. 
Eveland and Scheufele (2000) show that if citizens are exposed to a new piece of political 
information, the original knowledge gap becomes more substantial among less educated 
citizens and more educated ones, which suggests that sophistication is beneficial for the 
processing of additional elements of knowledge. According to Kahne and Bowyer (2017), the 
level of political knowledge is unrelated to the extent of bias applied.  
On the whole, there is a remarkable amount of empirical evidence – primarily based on 
samples of American citizens – on the positive link between political sophistication and biased 
views, and less empirical support for an opposite or no effect. We see two important 
characteristics of the literature that may account for mixed results. First, the overwhelming 
majority of empirical evidence is produced in the US which offers a special, stable bipartisan 
context for voters, hence the evidence coming from this context may not be generalizable to 
other polities. Second, a notable part of works addressing this question either investigates one 
particular aspect of sophistication (e.g., interest or education) or merges several aspects into 
one. We argue that such ambiguous operationalisations easily produce spurious correlations 
between partisan bias and sophistication as they might confound the role of well-distinguishable 
aspects of sophistication, such as education, political interest, and acquisition of political 
information. Therefore, we designed our research to overcome these ambiguities. We 
investigate the question on data from 30 European countries, mostly multi-party polities. The 
data sets we use are from the European Social Survey project, which produces one of the best-
quality individual level, cross-national datasets. Methodologically, instead of merging different 
aspects of political sophistication into one composite index, we test the effect of the three most 
often investigated elements (political interest, education and political news consumption) 
separately.  This approach enables us to understand the role of sophistication from a nuanced 
perspective. 
Conceptualizing and measuring bias 
People’s beliefs and evaluations rely to a large extent on what Lippmann (1922, p. 4) calls 
the “pseudo environment” which is “a representation of the environment which is in lesser or 
greater degree made by man himself” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 4). We refer to the distance between 
the real political environment and the pseudo-environment in one’s mind as absolute bias. In 
other words, evaluations relying on pseudo environments which are more distant from the real 
environment are more biased. 
While “bias” generally implies that there is a gap between one’s beliefs and reality, when 
speaking about political evaluations, this is not always the case. When asking people about their 
evaluation or opinion about any aspect of politics we often cannot set up a benchmark to 
differentiate between right or wrong answers. Therefore, when measuring bias in non-factual 
beliefs, the most frequently applied technique is to measure the relative bias which is the 
deviation of the evaluation of a partisan group from the evaluation of the opposing partisan 
group. Nonetheless, the driving forces behind absolute and relative bias are the same. The 
opinions of Democrats and Republicans in factual questions (like economic performance or 
crime rate) deviate from each other  in a similar manner as in the case of non-factual questions 
(like the perceived position of the US in the world or perceived moral climate) (Shani, 2006). 
Therefore, it is possible to make inferences about the amount of partisan bias based on the gap 
between non-factual evaluations of partisan groups. 
Measuring partisan bias in survey context is a challenging task (Flynn, Nyhan, & Reifler, 
2017), and this is especially true in a European multi-party context. In order to estimate partisan 
bias, first, we must identify well-distinguishable groups along party lines, and then, we have to 
choose a topic on which the views of these partisan groups differ due to their dissimilar partisan 
interests. In an American context, the two relevant political groups are Democrats and 
Republicans, while the topic of partisan relevance generally is a cabinet-related performance 
question, as for example, how respondents evaluate the performance of the president, the 
performance of the economy or some specific policy measures (Bartels, 2002; Bisgaard, 2015; 
Jerit & Barabas, 2012; Shani, 2006). To stay as close to the American research tradition as 
possible, and at the same time to acknowledge the differences between the political 
characteristics of European polities and the US, we propose to compare the satisfaction of 
government and opposition voters about the performance of their national government.ii While 
these satisfaction scores may contain evaluations about single policy decisions, the evaluation 
of the government is strongly related to previously established beliefs and partisan preferences. 
Government supporters are supposed to have positively biased evaluations, while the supporters 
of opposition parties are likely to have negatively biased evaluations on how the government 
performs. 
Comparing the political evaluations of voters based on their government/opposition status is 
not a novelty, there is a growing body of literature that approaches the so called “winner-loser 
gap” on questions of political satisfaction and trust (Anderson & LoTempio, 2002; Anderson 
& Tverdova, 2001; Blais & Gélineau, 2007; Brunell & Buchler, 2012; Craig, Martinez, 
Gainous, & Kane, 2006; Curini, Jou, & Memoli, 2012; Howell & Justwan, 2013; Singh, 
Karakoç, & Blais, 2012; Singh, Lago, & Blais, 2011). Nevertheless, the “winner-loser gap” has 
not been explicitly linked to partisan bias in the European literature. We argue that satisfaction 
with the performance of the national government is an adequate question to measure bias in 
comparative European survey research, as it is a general, extensively surveyed and easily 
interpretable item with clear partisan relevance for government and opposition party groups.  
Data and variables 
 
The analysis of the study relies on the pooled dataset of the first seven rounds of the 
European Social Survey project (European Social Survey, 2015). To limit the heterogeneity of 
the sample in terms of cultural and socio-political background, we analysed the electorates of 
30 European democracies, including the 28 member states of the European Union and Norway 
and Switzerland. The pooled dataset contains more than 230 000 individual subjects and 138 
country-cases (see Appendix 1). However, the statistical models rely on a significantly reduced 
number of observations compared to the original database, primarily due to the high rate of 
subjects who did not participate in the previous elections or refused to answer which party they 
voted for. 
It is important to note that the sample used for answering the research question includes only 
those voters who both participated in the last national elections and were willing to report their 
vote choice or who felt close to a party. This implicates that our conclusions apply to those who 







Dependent and independent variables 
 
Based on what has been mentioned above, the dependent variable of the research is 
satisfaction with the national governmentiii, measured on a 0 to 10 scale, ranging from 
“extremely dissatisfied” to “extremely satisfied”.  
One key independent variable of the research is being a government or an opposition party 
voter. Data about government composition and dates of elections and investitures are retrieved 
from the dataset of the Comparative Political Data Set project (Armingeon, Isler, Knöpfel, & 
Weisstanner, 2016). We coded those respondents “government voters” who indicated to have 
voted for a party which was in office during the fieldwork period of the survey. In order to make 
a clear distinction between government and opposition parties, we excluded the cases when 
fieldwork period overlapped with the period between parliamentary elections and the 
investiture of the new government, the cases when the incumbent government was a 
technocratic one, and finally, we excluded the supporters of two small parties that left their 
government coalition during the fieldwork period.  
Other independent variables are the main aspects of political sophistication. As political 
sophistication has at least three widely analysed yet empirically different facets, we investigated 
all of them, namely, political information acquisition, level of education and political interest.  
Education is measured by the number of years spent in the education system, assuming 
values between 0 and 35 (we excluded the few cases when the time spent in education exceeded 
35 years). 
Political interest is measured on a four-point scale which ranges from (1), not at all to (4), 
very interested. 
We measure acquisition of political information with the time spent on gaining political 
information on an average weekday. The dataset contains information on three political news 
sources, newspaper, radio, and television. Answers range from 0 (not at all) to 7 (more than 3 
hours), where 1 point means an additional 30 minutes reading on average. It is reasonable to 
think that gaining information can be best described by newspaper reading, however, with 
diminishing levels of newspaper reading across time, the ESS project stopped asking about both 
newspaper reading and radio listening. Thus, in the sixth and seventh data rounds, there are no 
questions on these two aspects. The time spent with watching political content in the television 
is present in all data rounds, but we consider it a less reliable predictor of high political 
information. We build this assumption on former research underlining that the amount devoted 
to television watching – and mainly to commercial channels – has a negative effect on citizens’ 
well-informedness (Aarts & Semetko, 2003; Ostman & Parker, 1987). Hence, we decided to 
run two separate sets of models using either the amount of time spent on reading political news 
or use the models including political news watching, and we use the latter to check the 
robustness of our results (see Table 3 in the Supplementary file). 
As we assume that the satisfaction gap between government and opposition voters is 
influenced by sophistication, the effects of primary interest are the interaction effects between 
voters’ government/opposition status and the elements of political sophistication. 
- government/opposition status x education 
- government/opposition status x political interest 
- government/opposition status x political awareness 
Therefore, the three sophistication variables are entered in the models both in a simple form 




We used several control variables that may influence satisfaction with the government. This 
is crucial because the study’s aim is to measure the extent of bias, and not the difference in 
evaluations caused by objectively different conditions, values and preferences. First, we 
included variables on social conditions which can strongly shape objective life conditions, and 
therefore, also one’s perceptions on government policies: 
- gender 
- the income decile where the household of the respondent belongs to 
- the subjective general health of respondents on a 1 to 5 scale 
- a dummy variable about self-reported membership of a discriminated group 
- a dummy variable about whether the respondent is unemployed 
Second, we included variables which can account for a general attitude of satisfaction, 
optimism and acceptance of the status quo. Therefore, we included 
- satisfaction with life, on a 0 to 10 scale 
- trust in other people, on a 0 to 10 scale, and we expect a positive effect for both 
variables.  
Third, we included a group of variables on political and religious values that may strongly 
influence one’s satisfaction with a government. Therefore, we included 
- the degree of religiousness, on a 0 to 10 scale 
- the ideological position on a left-right scale (0 to 10 scale) 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables and a correlation table of 




In order to answer the research question, we built pooled OLS regressions. As the dataset is 
a repeated cross-sectional one, we considered country effects and general time trends in political 
satisfaction across Europe by using country-case fixed effects and by clustering robust standard 
errors by country-cases.iv It is important to note that the three elements of sophistication are not 
strongly correlated, for example, education and newspaper reading are practically unrelated to 
each other (r=0.063; see correlation table in Table 2 in the Supplementary file). The results of 
the regressions are reported in Table 1. 
Table 1  
 
The effect of the interaction of voter status and sophistication on satisfaction with the 
government. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Government voter 0.353* 1.289*** 1.142*** 
 (0.146) (0.120) (0.0864) 
Government voter*Political interest 0.370***   
 (0.064)   
Government voter*Education 0.006  
  (0.009)  
Government voter*Newspaper reading 0.179*** 
      (0.029) 
Political interest -0.145*** 0.034 0.034 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) 
Education 0.003 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
Newspaper reading 0.025 0.026 -0.064* 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.030) 
Life satisfaction 0.187*** 0.187*** 0.186*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Left/right position 0.091** 0.095** 0.094** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Women -0.158*** -0.160*** -0.160*** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) 
Trust in others 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Religiousness 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Member of discriminated group -0.405*** -0.413*** -0.407*** 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
Subjective health 0.022 0.025 0.025 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Household's income -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Unemployed -0.074 -0.075 -0.077 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
Constant 1.181*** 0.710*** 0.785*** 
  (0.181) (0.195) (0.187) 
Number of Observations 64558 
Number of Groups 92 
F 181.6            177.1            254.3 
Adjusted R square 0.283 0.279 0.280 
Note. Entries are regression coefficients of pooled OLS regressions absorbing country-case 
effects, with robust standard errors clustered for country-cases. Dependent variable: satisfaction 
with the government. Sample: First five rounds of ESS: 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010. 
Population and design weights applied. For the exact wording of the survey questions see 
Appendix 2. 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
 
The significant positive effects show that satisfaction levels of government and opposition 
supporters are significantly different in the case of more and less interested respondents, and 
the same applies for more or less heavy political news consumers. Both interest and the time 
spent on gaining political information widen the satisfaction gap between the two groups. We 
interpret these differences as an indication of stronger bias for citizens who are interested in 
politics or who are politically more informed. Contrary to this, the size of the gap between the 
satisfaction of government and opposition supporters is not affected by the level of education. 
This result gives support to the claims of Achen and Bartels showing that “the educated, 
including the highly educated, have gone astray in their moral and political judgments as often 
as anyone else” (Achen & Bartels, 2016, p. 310). 
The effects of the control variables for which we had prior expectations point to the expected 
direction, although the effect of health, unemployment and income are insignificant. The effects 
of the other control variables are highly significant, and the coefficients show notable effect 
sizes. Being more satisfied with life, having more right-wing ideological views, nurturing more 
trust in other people and being more religious lead to more satisfaction with the government, 
while membership in a discriminated group and being a woman have a negative effect on the 
satisfaction scores. 
In Figure 1 to 3, we report the linear predictions for the independent variables (based on the 
results of Model 1). The satisfaction gap between government and opposition supporters widens 
both with consuming more political information and with growing levels of political interest to 
reaching the double of the initial difference between the most interested and most informed 






We checked the robustness of our results in several ways. Firstly, as we mentioned above, 
we tested whether it makes a difference if we operationalize political news consumption with 
news watching (present in 7 data rounds) instead of news reading (present in 5 data rounds). 
The results show that the two kinds of political information gaining have very similar effect 
(Table 3 in the Supplementary file). Secondly, a considerable part of former results include 
identifiers (e. g. Americans who identify themselves as Democrats or Republicans) instead of 
“voters”, therefore we wanted to check whether this kind of alternative operationalization for 
the independent variable could cause any difference in the results, and we run models 
operationalizing government support with feeling close to a governing party instead of with 
voting for a government party. Again, the modification did not produce a notable difference in 
the results (see Table 4 in the Supplementary file). Thirdly, it is possible to argue that the 
patterns of media consumption have undergone radical changes in the analysed period, and that 
the heavy decline of newspaper reading could influence our results. To account for such 
eventual temporary effects, we run the above models for each ESS round separately (see Table 
5 in the Supplementary file). In these models, results are very similar to those reported in the 
main ones. The interaction effects for political interest and newspaper reading are positive and 
significant (except for interest in Round 4, which effect is insignificant) and for education, they 
are insignificant.  
Additionally, the direction and the size of the significant interaction results in Table 1 
(government voter x interest; government voter x political news watching) are very similar 
when controlling (or not) for ESS rounds and country dummies, and when the set of control 
variables is slightly changed. The effect of education is more sensitive to the inclusion or 
exclusion of controls, but in models with high explanatory power and hence with a smaller 
number of omitted variables, its effect is consistently insignificant. To sum up, the effects of 
political interest and political information acquisition are consistently positive and substantial, 




The question whether political sophistication decreases partisan bias (and improves the 
quality of political judgements) is of particular interest for both democratic theory and policy-
making as it has primarily important theoretical and empirical implications (Lippmann, 1922). 
If raising the levels of education and political information fosters people’s impartiality and 
contributes to grounded and rational decisions on an individual level, then these may potentially 
lead to better political decisions on a societal level. Hence, enhancing the citizenry’s 
sophistication might be a key factor which contributes to the improvement of the quality of 
democratic functioning. As Dalton highlights, “greater political skills” should enable citizens 
“to be functionally independent of party cues” (Dalton, 1984, p. 281). Along the lines of this 
thought, political sophisticates more easily ascertain if their preferred party or politician departs 
from their promises; they recognize such failures earlier than the less aware and less informed 
strata of the electorate. Moreover, they may perceive more correctly the real costs of appealing 
but – in the long run – deleterious policies. Following this line of thought, political 
sophistication’s role might be indispensable in promoting “partisan independence” and 
warranting well-functioning democratic accountability. 
Not only are these hypotheses normatively appealing, but they are also widely shared by 
democratic theorists and policymakers. Anyhow, this research offers no support for them. There 
is no denying that the effect of education on biased opinion-formation is not significant; in other 
words, educated citizens are neither more, nor less biased opinion formers than less educated 
ones, but interest and information consumption strongly contribute to bias. Therefore, our 
findings question the ideas of “sophistication optimists”  who praise sophistication and ponder 
the exclusion of the uninformed stratum of the electorate from the democratic process (e.g,, 
Brennan, 2017).  
Taking everything into account, we arrive at the conclusion that taking away the suffrage of 
uneducated and politically unknowledgeable people does not guarantee the impartial cognition 
of politics, and therefore it would not significantly improve the quality of democratic decision-
making. Nevertheless, the assertion on the bias-generating nature of political interest and 
information consumption which has been recurrently explored in an American context hold in 
a European one as well. These results reinforce that people who “have a taste for politics” and 
are politically aware apply more partisan cues and perceive politics in a non-objective manner 







The study clarified the relationship between partisan bias and three aspects of political 
sophistication on a large, repeated cross-national sample of European voters. This question has 
long been characterised by contradictory theoretical expectations and divergent empirical 
results. The question of political sophistication is highly important as its effects on the 
democratic polity are essential in assessing the prerequisites, the scopes, and potential outcomes 
of the democratic process. The results of the multiple regression models show that political 
interest and political information acquisition are strongly linked to partisan bias. The third 
element, education, does not have a significant effect when interest and news consumption are 
also controlled for.  
The paper contributes to the state of the art in three major ways. First, theoretically, both 
recent optimistic (Brennan, 2017; Somin, 2016) and pessimistic (see especially Achen & 
Bartels, 2016)  suppositions on the role of sophistication have been partially challenged on the 
ground of our results. Our findings may help to bring theoretical expectations and the most 
recent empirical results somewhat closer to each other by showing that education does not 
exacerbate bias on its own, while political interest and information acquisition leads to more 
biased views. This implies that when theorizing about the role of sophistication it is worth 
differentiating between the aspects of sophistication as they appear to play different roles in the 
creation of bias. 
Second, methodologically, the most important contribution of the paper is that it used a novel 
measurement method to estimate the level of partisan bias in European democracies. On the top 
of that, the paper significantly contributes to our knowledge on partisanship in the European 
electorate on which relatively scarce evidence is available because the majority of research 
focuses on partisan divides between Republicans and Democrats in the context of the United 
States. 
Thirdly, the results have practical relevance as well. Political interest is the most important 
element – among the examined ones – which significantly contributes to politically biased 
evaluations. Essentially, this implies that (even among politically engaged citizens) voters with 
non-partisan thoughts on their minds are the most rational, unbiased information processors. 
However, the fact that education does not make a difference in making citizens more objective 
in the way they evaluate the political universe, and the effect of more information is positive 
refutes the idea according to which the suffrage of illiterate citizens should be constrained or 
taken away. Education does not appear to have a positive effect on more objective political 
decisions but neither it has a deleterious one. Thus, when assessing the results from the 
viewpoint of policy-making, it appears that raising awareness and enhancing educational 
capacities are not the best tools to make citizens’ information processing less biased. These 
results, therefore, do not allow to assume that education and political well-informedness are 
remedies for all problems connected to the shortcomings of contemporary democracies.  
The results, however, also emerge some puzzling questions. We assume that the effect of 
newspaper reading and television watching on bias may be due to the abundance of partisan 
messages in media sources and citizens’ unconditional adoption of them. Therefore, the 
mechanism of directional information seeking (Kunda, 1990, p. 481) and confirmation bias 
(seeking information to support existing predispositions) (Lodge & Taber, 2005, p. 476) has to 
be explored further. Additionally, it comes about as an interesting question, as it goes against 
widely shared expectations, why education proves to be inefficient in fostering more nuanced 
views. These questions are beyond the scope of this paper but provide fertile ground for future 
research. 
We conclude that the relationship between sophistication and bias is far more complex than 
it could be described with a simple positive or negative correlation. Therefore, future research 
concentrating on non-linear relationships between bias and the most important aspects of 
sophistication could further clarify this central question. The mechanisms underlying selective 
political perception, the role of interest and the effects of education have to be explored further 
in order to help the elaboration of both more accurate theories on sophistication and policy 
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Predictive margins of voters’ government/opposition status with a 95% confidence interval, 
with regard to political interest. Dependent variable is satisfaction with the government, ranging 
from 0 to 10. Predictions for government voters are indicated with black, predictions for 





Predictive margins of voters’ government/opposition status with a 95% confidence interval, 
with regard to newspaper reading. Dependent variable is satisfaction with the government, 
ranging from 0 to 10. Predictions for government voters are indicated with black, predictions 
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Predictive margins of voters’ government/opposition status with a 95% confidence interval, 
with regard to education. Dependent variable is satisfaction with the government, ranging from 
0 to 10. Predictions for government voters are indicated with black, predictions for opposition 





Country-cases included in the analysis. 
 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 
Austria * * *    * 
Belgium  * * * * * *  
Bulgaria    * * * *  
Croatia     *    
Cyprus   * *  *  
Czech Republic * *   * * * 
Denmark  * * * * * * * 
Estonia   *  *  * * 
Finland * * * * * * * 
France  * * * * * * * 
Germany  * * * * * * 
Greece  * *   *   
Hungary  * * * * * * * 
Iceland   *    *  
Ireland  * *  * * * * 
Italy  *     *  
Latvia    *    
Lithuania     * * * 
Luxemburg  * *      
Netherlands  * *  *   * 
Norway * * * * * * * 
Poland  * * * * * * * 
Portugal  *  * * * *  
Romania     *    
Slovakia   * * * * *  
Slovenia  *  * * * * * 
Spain  * * * * * * * 
Sweden   * * * * *  
Switzerland  * * * * * * * 




The exact wording of the survey questions analysed. 
Satisfaction with the government. Now thinking about the [national] government,, how satisfied 
are you with the way it is doing its job? 
Government voter. Which party did you vote for in that election? (Recoded into categories of 
government/opposition supporters.) 
Education. About how many years of education have you completed, whether full-time or part-
time? Please report these in full-time equivalents and include compulsory years of schooling.  
Political interest. How interested would you say you are in politics? 
Newspaper reading. And how much of this time is spent reading about politics and current 
affairs? 
Tv watching. And again on an average weekday, how much of your time watching television is 
spent watching news or programmes about politics and current affairs1? 
Life satisfaction. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole 
nowadays? 
Left/right position. In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Using this card, 
where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? 
Religiousness. Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would 
you say you are? 
Trust in others. Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 
10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted. 
Member of discriminated group. Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group 
that is discriminated against in this country? 
Health. How is your health in general? Would you say it is… 
Unemployed. And which of these descriptions best describes your situation (in the last seven 
days)? Please select only one (both “unemployed and actively looking for a job” and 






Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables (first seven rounds: 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 
2010, 2012, 2014). 
  N of 
observations 
Original variable Standardized form 
  Mean  Std. D. Min.  Max. Min.  Max. 
Satisfaction with the government 250608 4.171 2.463 0 10   
Voted for a government party 157077 0.513 0.5 0 1   
Feels close to a government party 125703 0.437 0.496 0 1   
Woman 260806 0.535 0.499 0 1   
Member of discriminated group 258846 0.064 0.245 0 1   
Unemployed 260894 0.066 0.248 0 1   
Political interest 260160 2.627 0.902 1 4 -1.523 1.805 
Years spent in education 260894 12.228 4.05 0 35 -3.019 5.622 
Political newspaper reading 135088 1.202 0.882 0 7 -1.362 6.572 
Political tv content viewing 251187 1.968 1.313 0 7 -1.498 3.832 
Age 260894 47.888 18.485 13 100 -1.887 2.819 
Satisfaction with life 259800 6.921 2.283 0 10 -3.032 1.349 
Left-right ideological position 226986 5.09 2.174 0 10 -2.341 2.258 
Trust in other people 260062 5.026 2.448 0 10 -2.053 2.032 
Religiousness 258859 4.722 2.994 0 10 -1.577 1.763 
Health status 260652 3.793 0.925 1 5 -3.02 1.306 







































































































































































































































Satisfaction with the government 1          
 
     
Government voter 0.382 1         
 
     
Feels close to the government 0.357 0.809 1        
 
     
Political interest 0.035 0.004 0.005 1       
 
     
Years spent in education 0.014 -0.028 -0.015 0.212 1            
Political newspaper reading 0.041 0.01 0.009 0.281 0.063 1           
Political tv content viewing -0.001 -0.019 -0.027 0.191 -0.117 0.276 1          
Satisfaction with life 0.292 0.062 0.058 0.077 0.073 0.046 -0.03 1         
Left-right ideological position 0.198 0.143 0.12 -0.036 -0.036 0.004 0.011 0.127 1        
Woman -0.038 -0.001 -0.003 -0.134 -0.009 -0.087 -0.05 0.008 -0.036 1       
Trust in other people 0.227 -0.009 -0.005 0.1 0.164 0.054 -0.024 0.305 0.006 0 1      
Religiousness 0.114 0.084 0.077 -0.021 -0.12 0.003 0.028 0.064 0.203 0.157 -0.014 1     
Member of discriminated group -0.089 -0.056 -0.053 0.049 0.053 0.015 0.018 -0.1 -0.046 0.016 -0.044 -0.012 1    
Health status 0.125 0.019 0.022 0.059 0.213 -0.012 -0.128 0.315 0.057 -0.036 0.186 -0.05 -0.049 1   
Income decile 0.126 0.026 0.035 0.136 0.318 0.038 -0.098 0.262 0.043 -0.088 0.212 -0.103 -0.022 0.266 1  
Unemployed -0.067 -0.026 -0.032 -0.029 -0.01 -0.022 0.008 -0.154 -0.038 0 -0.055 -0.023 0.053 -0.021 -0.112 1 
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Table 3  
 
The effect of the interaction of voter status and sophistication on satisfaction with the government in the first seven 
rounds (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014). 
 
Government voter 1.096*** 0.571***         1.524***         
 (0.0921) (0.117) (0.118) 
Government voter*Tv watching 0.136***   
 (0.0192)      
Government voter*Political interest  0.304***  
  (0.0477)  
Government voter*Education                  -0.0108 
                    (0.00773) 
Political interest 0.0417*   -0.0992*** 0.0427* 
 (0.0194)    (0.0248) (0.0193) 
Education -0.00171    -0.00139 0.00349 
 (0.00365)    (0.00369) (0.00537) 
Tv watching -0.0179    0.0462*** 0.0473*** 
 (0.0132)    (0.00953) (0.00967) 
Life satisfaction 0.184*** 0.185*** 0.185*** 
 (0.00642)    (0.00634) (0.00634) 
Left/right position 0.0745**  0.0725** 0.0752** 
 (0.0250)    (0.0251) (0.0252) 
Women -0.118*** -0.113*** -0.119*** 
 (0.0230)    (0.0231) (0.0232) 
Trust in others 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 
 (0.00595)    (0.00582) (0.00597) 
Religiousness 0.0528*** 0.0523*** 0.0528*** 
 (0.00522)    (0.00517) (0.00525) 
Discriminated -0.450*** -0.445*** -0.451*** 
 (0.0478)    (0.0477) (0.0475) 
Health 0.0549*** 0.0534** 0.0550*** 
 (0.0158)    (0.0160) (0.0157) 
Income -0.000400    -0.00149 -0.000763 
 (0.00639)    (0.00631) (0.00636) 
Unemployed -0.0792    -0.0799 -0.0798 
 (0.0451)    (0.0451) (0.0453) 
Constant 0.631*** 0.883*** 0.418* 
 (0.155)    (0.157) (0.164) 
Observations 113877 113877 113877 
Adjusted R square 0.298    0.300 0.297 
 
Entries are regression coefficients of pooled OLS regressions absorbing country-case effects, with robust 
standard errors clustered for country-cases. Dependent variable: satisfaction with the government. Political 
awareness is proxied with the daily amount of watching political content in television. Population and design 
weights applied.  
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
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Table 4  
 
The effect of the interaction of voter status and sophistication on satisfaction with the government in the first five 
rounds (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). 
 
Government identifier 1.416*** 0.785*** 1.526*** 
 (0.124) (0.184) (0.170) 
Government identifier*Newspaper reading 0.149***   
 (0.0361)   
Government identifier*Interest  0.290***  
  (0.0824)  
Government identifier*Education   0.00618 
    (0.0102) 
Interest -0.0002 -0.122** -0.0004 
 (0.0332) (0.0410) (0.0334) 
Education 0.00152 0.00191 -0.00113 
 (0.00502) (0.00498) (0.00633) 
Newspaper reading -0.0483 0.0158 0.0158 
 (0.0302) (0.0245) (0.0249) 
Life satisfaction 0.166*** 0.167*** 0.166*** 
 (0.00990) (0.00995) (0.0100) 
Left/right position 0.0997** 0.0976** 0.0999** 
 (0.0351) (0.0350) (0.0351) 
Women -0.152*** -0.149*** -0.151*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0278) (0.0281) 
Trust in others 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.127*** 
 (0.00916) (0.00906) (0.00907) 
Religiousness 0.0633*** 0.0627*** 0.0632*** 
 (0.00717) (0.00712) (0.00717) 
Discriminated -0.431*** -0.428*** -0.435*** 
 (0.0713) (0.0711) (0.0704) 
Health 0.0436 0.0429 0.0439 
 (0.0293) (0.0295) (0.0293) 
Income 0.00187 0.000785 0.00156 
 (0.00864) (0.00879) (0.00848) 
Unemployed -0.00689 -0.0119 -0.00806 
 (0.0535) (0.0512) (0.0534) 
Constant 0.964*** 1.238*** 0.917*** 
  (0.222) (0.215) (0.217) 
Observations 51512 51512 51512 
Adjusted R square 0.288 0.290 0.287 
 
Entries are regression coefficients of pooled OLS regressions absorbing country-case effects, with robust 
standard errors clustered for country-cases. Dependent variable: satisfaction with the government. Independent 
variable: feeling close to a government party. Population and design weights applied.  
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
 
  




The effect of the interaction of voter status and political news reading on satisfaction with the government in the 
first five ESS data rounds (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). 
 
  Newspaper reading 
 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5    
Government voter 1.230*** 1.026*** 0.917*** 1.228*** 1.203*** 
 (0.164) (0.0890) (0.171) (0.250) (0.198)    
Government voter*Newspaper 
reading 
0.260* 0.133* 0.250*** 0.0891** 0.198**  
  (0.113) (0.0504) (0.0373) (0.0246) (0.0573)    
Interest 0.0637 -0.0249 0.0117 0.0783 0.0372    
 (0.0432) (0.0577) (0.0869) (0.0646) (0.0533)    
Education 0.00257 0.00502 0.00422 0.0113 -0.0116    
 (0.0134) (0.00605) (0.0102) (0.0100) (0.0119)    
Newspaper reading -0.133 -0.00885 -0.108 -0.0181 -0.0689    
 (0.0645) (0.0657) (0.0766) (0.0388) (0.0597)    
Life satisfaction 0.162*** 0.180*** 0.177*** 0.201*** 0.195*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0155) (0.0188) (0.0176) (0.0154)    
Left/right position 0.0853 0.0123 0.0873 0.110 0.164*   
 (0.0660) (0.0329) (0.0612) (0.0750) (0.0765)    
Women -0.284** -0.124 -0.225** -0.130 -0.0864*   
 (0.0741) (0.0833) (0.0573) (0.0712) (0.0345)    
Trust in others 0.124*** 0.152*** 0.123*** 0.146*** 0.114*** 
 (0.0246) (0.00649) (0.0113) (0.0187) (0.0171)    
Religiousness 0.0740*** 0.0520*** 0.0548*** 0.0630*** 0.0348*   
 (0.0180) (0.0107) (0.0110) (0.0132) (0.0121)    
Discriminated -0.560** -0.523** -0.428** -0.404*** -0.179    
 (0.166) (0.181) (0.146) (0.0650) (0.0931)    
Health 0.0431 -0.00380 -0.00927 0.0347 0.0640    
 (0.0496) (0.0363) (0.0726) (0.0199) (0.0384)    
Income -0.00303 -0.0221 -0.0393* -0.00394 0.00744    
 (0.0135) (0.0126) (0.0149) (0.0180) (0.0107)    
Unemployed -0.0745 -0.176 -0.0556 -0.121 0.0289    
 
(0.103) (0.0897) (0.191) (0.0720) (0.0543)    
Constant 0.936** 1.593*** 1.479*** 0.116 0.238    
  (0.303) (0.265) (0.180) (0.250) (0.522)    
Observations 10541 14465 12067 14648 12837 
Adjusted R square 0.270 0.258 0.254 0.294 0.324    
 
Entries are regression coefficients of OLS regressions absorbing country-case effects. with robust standard 
errors clustered for country-cases, separetely run for ESS rounds 1-5. Dependent variable: satisfaction with the 
government. Population and design weights applied.  
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
Table 6 
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The effect of the interaction of voter status and interest on satisfaction with the government in the first five ESS 
data rounds (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). 
 
  Interest 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5    
Government voter 0.478 0.0880 0.689 0.115 0.486**  
 (0.264) (0.162) (0.448) (0.284) (0.153)    
Government voter*Interest 0.407** 0.407*** 0.198 0.440** 0.348**  
  (0.123) (0.0625) (0.203) (0.126) (0.0991)    
Interest -0.133 -0.205** -0.0902 -0.150 -0.121**  
 (0.0893) (0.0577) (0.0631) (0.0941) (0.0344)    
Education 0.00431 0.00524 0.00320 0.0125 -0.0114    
 (0.0138) (0.00562) (0.0104) (0.00977) (0.0117)    
Newspaper reading -0.0150 0.0569 0.0208 0.0295 0.0218    
 (0.0285) (0.0475) (0.0781) (0.0459) (0.0464)    
Life satisfaction 0.164*** 0.181*** 0.179*** 0.203*** 0.196*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0144) (0.0191) (0.0173) (0.0155)    
Left/right position 0.0874 0.0137 0.0845 0.105 0.156    
 (0.0657) (0.0328) (0.0618) (0.0733) (0.0767)    
Women -0.280** -0.122 -0.218** -0.132 -0.0892*   
 (0.0766) (0.0797) (0.0592) (0.0757) (0.0350)    
Trust in others 0.125*** 0.153*** 0.123*** 0.145*** 0.114*** 
 (0.0233) (0.00660) (0.0110) (0.0177) (0.0172)    
Religiousness 0.0726*** 0.0522*** 0.0545*** 0.0616*** 0.0343*   
 (0.0177) (0.0104) (0.0112) (0.0125) (0.0123)    
Discriminated -0.544** -0.532** -0.438** -0.383*** -0.189    
 (0.153) (0.183) (0.135) (0.0712) (0.0899)    
Health 0.0399 -0.00637 -0.00795 0.0309 0.0621    
 (0.0504) (0.0361) (0.0754) (0.0203) (0.0373)    
Income -0.00679 -0.0235 -0.0393* -0.00358 0.00673    
 (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0149) (0.0181) (0.00935)    
Unemployed -0.0791 -0.175* -0.0440 -0.105 0.0243    
 (0.0895) (0.0816) (0.190) (0.0677) (0.0544)    
Constant 1.291*** 1.990*** 1.604*** 0.713* 0.606    
  (0.304) (0.237) (0.353) (0.270) (0.527)    
Observations 10541 14465 12067 14648 12837 
Adjusted R square 0.272 0.263 0.253 0.300 0.327    
 
Entries are regression coefficients of OLS regressions absorbing country-case effects. with robust standard 
errors clustered for country-cases, separetely run for ESS rounds 1-5. Dependent variable: satisfaction with the 
government. Population and design weights applied.  
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 




The effect of the interaction of voter status and education on satisfaction with the government in the first five ESS 
data rounds (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). 
 
  Education 
 Round 1  Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5    
Government voter 1.465*** 1.141*** 1.234*** 1.234*** 1.346*** 
 (0.249) (0.271) (0.269) (0.186) (0.311)    
Government voter*Education 0.00756 0.00439 -0.000231 0.00787 0.00725    
  (0.0213) (0.0139) (0.0218) (0.0194) (0.00998)    
Interest 0.0660 -0.0270 0.0110 0.0785 0.0385    
 (0.0425) (0.0571) (0.0867) (0.0646) (0.0538)    
Education -0.0001 0.00259 0.00319 0.00732 -0.0151    
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011)    
Newspaper reading -0.0129 0.0579 0.0193 0.0298 0.0260    
 (0.0269) (0.0470) (0.0777) (0.0439) (0.0456)    
Life satisfaction 0.164*** 0.180*** 0.179*** 0.201*** 0.196*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0153) (0.0191) (0.0178) (0.0157)    
Left/right position 0.0873 0.0121 0.0869 0.110 0.165*   
 (0.0665) (0.0331) (0.0622) (0.0751) (0.0766)    
Women -0.289** -0.123 -0.224** -0.130 -0.0863*   
 (0.0735) (0.0840) (0.0582) (0.0705) (0.0345)    
Trust in others 0.124*** 0.152*** 0.124*** 0.146*** 0.114*** 
 (0.0250) (0.00642) (0.011) (0.0183) (0.0172)    
Religiousness 0.073** 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.063*** 0.035*   
 (0.0183) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0131) (0.0123)    
Discriminated -0.564** -0.523** -0.445** -0.409*** -0.186    
 (0.160) (0.177) (0.138) (0.0642) (0.0909)    
Health 0.0419 -0.003 -0.006 0.0343 0.0630    
 (0.0493) (0.0359) (0.0740) (0.0197) (0.0383)    
Income -0.00481 -0.0223 -0.0397* -0.0041 0.0071    
 (0.0128) (0.0125) (0.0155) (0.0176) (0.0108)    
Unemployed -0.0674 -0.175 -0.0446 -0.119 0.0228    
 (0.106) (0.0879) (0.190) (0.0742) (0.0530)    
Constant 0.804* 1.542*** 1.309*** 0.110 0.165    
  (0.309) (0.281) (0.242) (0.308) (0.483)    
Observations 10541 14465 12067 14648 12837 
Adjusted R square 0.267 0.258 0.252 0.294 0.323    
 
Entries are regression coefficients of OLS regressions absorbing country-case effects. with robust standard 
errors clustered for country-cases, separetely run for ESS rounds 1-5. Dependent variable: satisfaction with the 
government. Population and design weights applied.  
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
 




i It is worth to note that those with low interest and low knowledge do not remember political 
information at all. 
ii While it might seem plausible to use the left/right ideological position of parties to define the 
boundaries between competing political camps, we think that comparing the evaluations of 
government and opposition voters is a better decision on at least two grounds. Firstly, similarly 
to the Democrat-Republican divide, the government/opposition categories fundamentally 
reflect “who are with whom” on the political scene of the given country. Thus, they better 
reflect the boundaries of the competing camps than the left/right categories, especially if a 
government has a two-sided opposition. Even if opposition parties are ideologically very far 
from each other, the evaluations of their voters about the performance of the government might 
be very similar. Secondly, using the government/opposition categories the position of any party 
in any time period (excluding the period between elections and the investiture of the new 
government) is unquestionable. Thus, this method is clear and straightforward, which is not 
unconditionally true for the left/right divide. 
iii The exact wording of the question was „Now thinking about the [country] government, how 
satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?” 
iv We performed the analysis with STATA13, the code we used was  
areg y x1 x2 … [pweight=newweight], absorb(country-case) cluster(country-case) 
 
